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Abstract – Energy and climate policies are usually seen as measures to internalize externalities.
However, as a side effect, these policies redistribute wealth between consumers and producers,
and within these groups. While redistribution is seldom the focus of the academic literature in
energy economics, it plays a central role in real world policy debates. This paper compares the
redistribution effects of two major electricity policies: support schemes for renewable energy
sources, and CO2 pricing. We find that the redistribution effects of both policies are large, and
they work in opposed directions: While renewables support transfers wealth from producers to
consumers, carbon pricing does the opposite. More specifically, we show that moderate amounts
of wind subsidies leave consumers better off even if they bear the costs of subsidies. In the case
of CO2 pricing, we find that while suppliers as a whole benefit even without free allocation of
emission certificates, large amounts of producer surplus are redistributed between different types
of producers. These findings are derived from an analytical model of electricity markets, and a
calibrated numerical model of the Northwestern European integrated power system. Our findings
imply that a society with a preference for avoiding large redistribution might prefer a mix of
policies, even if CO2 pricing alone is the first best climate policy in terms of allocative efficiency.

Index Terms – Carbon tax, Emission trading, Redistribution, Consumer surplus, Producer
surplus, Wind power generation, Electricity market modeling

1. Introduction
Two major new policies were implemented in the European power sector during the last
decade. Many countries have introduced support schemes for renewable electricity, such
as feed-in-tariffs, certificate trading, or investment subsidies. As a consequence, the share
of renewables in electricity generation has been growing rapidly, from 13% in 1997 to
17% in 2008. According to official targets, the share of renewables in EU electricity
consumption shall reach 60-80% in 2050. The second major policy shift was the
introduction of CO2 pricing in the power sector via the EU emission trading scheme in
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2005. During the last seven years, the carbon price has fluctuated between zero and 30
€/t, with official expectations of prices between 100 €/t and 300 €/t by 2050.1
These new policies have and will continue to affect the profits of previously-existing
electricity generators. More general, they redistribute economic surplus between
producers and consumers and between different types of producers and consumers.
Support policies bring renewable capacity in the market that otherwise would not have
been there. These additional generators decrease the wholesale electricity price below the
level it would have been otherwise. For example, wind power reduces the price whenever
it is windy by shifting the supply curve (merit-order curve) to the right. This reduces the
income and thus the profits of existing generators. Consumer surplus increases due to
lower electricity prices. If subsidy costs are passed on to consumers, the net effect on
consumer surplus is ambiguous a priori.
CO2 pricing increases the variable costs of carbon-emitting plants. Whenever such
generators are price-setting, CO2 pricing increases the electricity price. Low-carbon
plants like nuclear and hydro power benefit from higher prices without higher costs.
Carbon-intensive generators like lignite, in contrast, see their profits reduced because
costs increase more than revenues. Consumer surplus is reduced due to higher electricity
prices, and increased if they receive the income from CO2 revenues. Again the net effect
on consumers is ambiguous.
In this paper, we model and quantify the redistribution effects of renewable support
policies and CO2 pricing. Following a dual methodological approach, we apply an
analytical (theoretical) and a numerical (empirical) model. We distinguish two sectors:
Conventional generators with sunk investments, and electricity consumers. State
revenues and expenditures are assumed to be passed on to consumers as lump-sum
payments. Generators are further distinguished by technology, since the effect of CO2
pricing on generators depends on their carbon intensity and the effect of renewable
subsidies depends on their capital intensity. Disaggregating consumers could yield
important insights, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Markets are assumed to be
competitive, thus profits are zero in the long term. The modeling approach is valid for
different types of CO2 pricing (emission trading, carbon tax) and different types of
renewables support (feed-in tariff, certificate trading, investment grants) and is in this
sense quite general. We use wind power as an example for a subsidized renewable
electricity source, but all findings apply to solar power and other zero marginal-cost
technologies as well.
We find that the redistribution effects of both policies are large. Overall, wind support
distributes surplus from producers to consumers and carbon pricing does the opposite.
Wind support transfers enough producer rents to consumers to make those better of even
if they pay the costs of subsidies. Wind support reduces the profits of base load
generators more than those of peak load generators. CO2 pricing reduces the profits of
coal-fired generators while increasing the profits of nuclear plants dramatically. Overall,
electricity generators benefit from carbon pricing even without free allocation of
emission permits.

1

2050 targets are taken from the Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission 2011).
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The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework and
introduces the models. Section 4 discusses the effects of wind support, section 5 those of
carbon pricing, and section 6 the combined effects of both policies. Section 7 concludes.

2. Literature Review
This paper aims at connecting two branches of literature that have discussed distributive
effects of climate and energy policies from quite different angles. The first branch
focuses on the depressing effect of renewables generation on the electricity price, which
has been termed “merit-order effect” by Sensfuß (2007). The second branch discusses the
impact of carbon pricing on consumer surplus and producer rents, sometimes labeled
“windfall profits”.
Modeling exercises for Germany (Sensfuß et al. 2008) and Spain (de Miera et al. 2008)
indicate that the additional supply of electricity from wind power reduces the spot price
so much that consumers are better off even if they have to bear the subsidy costs. Results
for Denmark (Munksgaard & Morthorst 2008) are less conclusive. Under emission
trading, wind support additionally decrease electricity prices via its lowering influence on
the CO2 price (Rathmann 2007). MacCormack et al. (2010) find the merit-order effect to
be larger when conventional generators have more market power because both the
additional supply and the uncertainty introduced by wind power reduce the incentive to
withhold capacity. While these studies apply numerical models, O’Mahoney & Denny
(2011) and Gil et al. (2012) use regression analyses. Confirming model results, they find
that both in Ireland and Spain the merit-order effect outweighs the subsidy costs for
consumers. Mount (2012) stresses the effect on producer profits and the “missing money”
to finance capital costs from short-term profits. Wissen & Nicolosi (2008) and
MacCormack et al. (2010) emphasize that the merit-order effect is only a short-term or
“transient” phenomenon, since any long-term equilibrium requires capital costs to be
recovered. While some of these papers acknowledge that economic surplus is
redistributed from producers to consumers, none accounts comprehensively for all
redistribution and efficiency effects.
The second branch of literature deals with the redistribution effects of carbon taxes and
emission trading schemes. Most of these studies are written in the context of discussions
of different allocation rules for emission allowances. Typically, the model the impact of
allocation rules on profits, and to what extent CO2 costs can be passed through to
consumers. A well-known result is that in the case of grandfathering large windfall
profits for producers occur that are paid by consumers, for example reported by Bode
(2006) and Sijm et al. (2006). Some authors find that the aggregated power generation
sector benefits even if allowances are fully auctioned. This is shown for the UK
(Martinez & Neuhoff 2005) and for North-West Europe (Chen et al. 2008). Similarly,
Burtraw et al. (2002) report for the US that only 9% of all allowances would need to be
grandfathered to preserve total producer profits when introducing CO2 certificates.
Our work contributes to the literature in three ways. First, while many of the existing
publications touch upon on a wide range of topics, we focus on redistribution effects.
Specifically, we estimate effects at different levels of policy intervention, and we
comprehensively account for redistributive flows between all actors such that they
3
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consistently add up to zero. Second, the existing literature discusses either renewables
deployment policies or CO2 pricing. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to analyze redistribution effects of both types of policies within one consistent
framework. This newly developed framework uses the long-term equilibrium as a
benchmark to evaluate both policies. Finally, combining an analytical with a numerical
model allows us tracing the causal mechanisms as well as providing quantitative
estimates where theoretical results are ambiguous. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper to provide an analytical model of redistribution via the electricity market.

3. Methodology
This section introduces the two models and outlines the framework in which we apply
both models. The analytical model is meant to generate insights into the causal
mechanisms of redistribution effects induced by climate and energy policy. The
numerical model quantifies redistribution flows for North-Western European countries
and provides results where analytical findings are ambiguous. Both models are applied
within the same consistent framework that uses the long-term equilibrium as a starting
point to compare the short-term impacts of both policies.

3.1. Framework
In a long-term equilibrium (LTE) on perfect and complete markets with free entry, profits
(rents, producer surplus) are zero.2 If a market features some sort of inertia and newly
introduced policies are not fully anticipated, a policy shock displace the system from its
LTE. Only during the transition towards a new LTE the policy might change profits and
thereby redistribute producer surplus to or from other actors. As MacCormack et al.
(2010) put it, redistribution of producer surplus is a “transient phenomenon” that vanishes
once the system has converged to the new LTE. In the power market, inertia is substantial
due to long lifetimes and building times of power plants and other infrastructure.
In this paper, we distinguish two time perspectives with corresponding market
equilibriums: the “long term” and the “short term”. In the long-term, the amount and type
of capacity is a choice variable that is decided upon by producers (“green field”
approach). In the short-term, producers take the existing capital stock as given at zero
costs (but are allowed to additionally invest). In both the long and the short term,
producers face production decisions.3 In other words, in the long term no capital is given
while in the short term there is a stock of sunk investments. While profits are zero in the
LTE, they are typically positive in the short-term equilibrium (STE). This is possible
because there is no free entry that could drive down short-term profits to zero, since
entrants had to build new capacity and pay the corresponding capital cost. In other words,
in the STE previously-existing (incumbent) generators are able to extract rents from their
sunk investments. These rents are used to finance capital costs. While both long term and
short term are analytical concepts that never describe a real market entirely correctly, we
2
Positive long-term profits would attract new investments that drive down prices to the point where profits disappear. Vice versa,
negative profits would lead to disinvestment, driving up prices until negative profits vanish.
3
Note that according to this definition, the capital stock is not fixed in the short term, but additional investments are possible.
Others (Hirth 2012, MacCormack et al. 2010) have labelled this the “medium term” and apply the term “short term” to a situation
where the capital stock is fixed without the possibility of additional investments.
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believe the short term as defined here is an appropriate assumption to analyze moderate
shocks to European power systems on a time horizons of 3 to 15 years.
In this research project, we exploit these two concepts to construct a framework that
allows comparing the distribution effect of different policies consistently (Figure 1). We
assume that the power market is in its LTE before policies are introduced. Then we
switch the perspective and derive the STE by taking the previously derived capacity as
given. Then a policy is introduced exogenously and unexpectedly that shifts the system to
a new STE. We define the redistributive effect of that policy as the difference of shortterm profits and consumer surplus between these two STEs. To compare two policies,
they are independently introduced starting from the same STE, and the redistribution
effects of the policies are then compared. The new LTE that would emerge after some
time is not of interest for this paper. This framework features two properties that are
necessary to compare redistribution effects of different policies:
1. The same benchmark is used for both policies.
2. All changes in short-term rents are strictly caused by policy changes.
Long-term equilibrium (LTE) without policies
• capital stock endogenous
• long-term profits zero
• scarcity prices

investments sunk
Short-term equilibrium (STE) prior to policy
• capital stock given
• short-term profits positive
• no scarcity prices

policy introduced
New STE with RES support
• short-term profits changed

CO2
pricing

Both
policies

Effect of a policy:
compare profits
before and after
policy is introduced

Compare Policies:
compare profits between
two new STEs
capital stock endogenous
New LTE with RES support
• LTE changed
• zero LT profits

(out of scope
of this paper)

Figure 1: This framework allows to consistently studying different policies with an analytical and a numerical
model. Starting from a long-term equilibrium with no policy, two short-term equilibriums (STE) are compared:
the STE prior to policy with a STE with a newly introduced policy.
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While deriving the long-term equilibrium is a standard methodology in the power
economics literature, using the resulting capacity mix to evaluate policies in a short-term
framework is to our knowledge a novel approach. An alternative to our short term / long
term dichotomy is to model the system’s adaptation to shocks dynamically in several
steps (Nicolosi 2012, Färber et al. 2012, Short et al. 2011, Prognos AG et al. 2010).
However, such scenario analysis typically features a multitude of dynamic shocks that
makes it very hard to identify the effect of a specific policy. Moreover, the starting points
of these studies are usually chosen in a way that the market is off its equilibrium in the
first place, meaning that changes in rents are not only caused by policy changes, but
simply by adjustment process towards the equilibrium.

3.2. Analytical Model
This subsection introduces a stylized cost-minimizing analytical model of the electricity
market and derives the LTE and the STE. We show that long term profits are zero while
in the STE producers are able to extract short-term rents from their sunk investment.
To develop a qualitative understanding of the major effects of these policies it is
sufficient to model two generation technologies, labeled “gas” and “coal” power.
Dynamic aspects like ramping constraints and electricity storage are neglected, as well as
heat and reserve market requirements, international, trade and grid constraints. These
details are taken into account in the numerical model (section 3.3). In both models a
perfect market is assumed where producers act fully competitive and with perfect
foresight on complete markets. Hence, the cost-minimizing solution is equivalent to the
market equilibrium. Electricity demand is perfectly price-inelastic and deterministic. All
fees and taxes are assumed to be specific and remain constant. Externalities are assumed
to be absent. We model energy-only markets with marginal pricing.
We extend a classical method from power economics (Stoft 2002, Green 2005) that uses
screening curves, a load duration curve4 (LDC), and a price duration curves (PDC) that is
derived from the first two (Figure 2a, b, c). A screening curve represents the total costs
per kW-year of one generation technology as a function of its full load hours. Its yintercept is the annuity of investment costs and the slope equals the variable costs. The
LDC shows the sorted hourly load of one year starting with the highest load hour. A price
duration curve shows the sorted hourly prices of one year starting with the highest price.
This model allows the representation of the two policies we aim to analyze: wind
support5 reshapes the LDC, while CO2 pricing pivots the screening curves. Before
introducing policies in sections 4 and 5, the LTE and the STE are derived in the
following.

4
5

For the illustrations we use hourly data for German power demand in 2009 (ENTSO-E).
We use quarter hourly feed-in data from German TSOs for 2009.
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Figure 2: Long-term equilibrium (left) and short-term equilibrium (right) described by screening curves (a,d),
load duration curve (b,e), and price duration curve (c,f). In the short term, screening curves do not contain
investment costs and the price duration curve does not contain scarcity prices ps.

We first derive the cost-minimal long-term capacity mix and dispatch, then show that
profits for all plants are zero in the cost-minimum, and finally explain that this is the
unique market equilibrium. Cost-minimal capacities and generation can be derived by
projecting the intercepts of the screening curves on the LDC. The LDC is then
horizontally divided. Each part of load is covered by the technology with the least-cost
screening curve for the respective full load hours. Gas power plants are cost effective at
lower full load hours (peak load) due to their low fixed-to-variable-cost ratio. Coal power
plants with higher capacity costs and lower variable costs cover base load. Hereby
optimal capacities and dispatch of plants are determined. The PDC is derived from the
equilibrium condition that the price equals the variable costs of the marginal plant, except

7
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in the one hour of the year when capacity is scarce. In this peak hour scarcity prices
occur.
We now show that gas plants earn zero profit. Unless capacity is scarce, the electricity
price is set by the variable costs of the marginal plant. Hence, operating gas plants are
always price-setting (Figure 2c). To recover capital costs, gas plants need to demand a
scarcity price . Under perfectly inelastic demand, this is only possible in exactly one
hour of the year, since at any other point in time there is some capacity available that
would supply electricity if the price would rise above variable costs.
(1)
(2)

The markup on specific (per MWh) variable costs
can only be chosen to exactly
cover the investment specific (per MW) costs
. A gas power plant cannot further
increase the scarcity price to make profit because other gas power plants would enter the
market and bid lower prices until the rent vanishes. Hence, the scarcity price implies zero
profits for gas power plants.
We now show that for the optimal capacity mix the scarcity price leads to zero profits
also for coal power plants. At the intersection of the screening curves in Figure 2a it
holds:
⇔

(

)

(3)
(4)

⇒

(

)

(5)

The right hand side of the last equation is the annual income of one unit of coal capacity
in the optimal capacity mix as indicated by the shaded area under the price duration curve
(Figure 2c). Hence, market income exactly covers the specific investment costs of coal
capacity if the capacity mix is cost-minimal. One scarcity price leads to zero profits for
both gas and coal power plants at the optimal capacity mix.
We now explain why this solution is the unique long-term market equilibrium. Let us
assume the system’s capacities deviate from their optimal values. Substituting gas for
coal capacity would increase of the width of the shaded area in Figure 2c, resulting in
profits for coal plants. Additional coal generators have an incentive to enter the market
until profits vanish. Substituting coal for gas capacity would lead to negative profits and
market exit. A decrease of total generation capacity would lead to profits via scarcity
prices and subsequent market entry. An increase of total generation capacity would make
scarcity pricing impossible, causing exit of suppliers. Thus the cost-minimal capacity mix
and the corresponding PDC is the unique LTE. To conclude, in the long-term equilibrium
load is covered at least costs and all power plants earn zero profits. This result can be
generalized to more than two technologies.
In the following we define short-term profits and show that in the STE, as defined in
section 3.1, they are positive. In the short term, capacities from the long-term equilibrium
are given. Investment costs for those existing plants are sunk and hence short-term
screening curves only contain variable costs and no investment costs (Figure 2d). Coal is
the least-cost technology at all full load hour values. However, it cannot cover the total
8
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load, because its capacity is constrained. The optimal dispatch does not change compared
to the long-term equilibrium. Total capacity is not scarce and thus there is no scarcity
price (Figure 2f). Hence, gas plants sell electricity at marginal costs whenever they
operate and do not earn any profits. On the other hand, coal power plants generate shortterm profits when gas is price-setting. The specific rent per MW (shaded area in Figure
2f) needs to be multiplied by the coal capacity
to calculate the absolute short-term
producer rent
:
(6)

In contrast to the LTE, where profits are zero, in the short term some producers can
extract short-term rents from their sunk investment.

3.3. Numerical Model
To relax some of the assumptions of the analytical model, a calibrated numerical model
of the North-Western European electricity market has been developed. As the analytical
model, it is deterministic, has an hourly resolution, assumes perfect and complete markets
and can be used to derive both the LTE and the STE. However, it provides more details,
such as a wider set of generation technologies, electricity storage, and international trade,
features a large set of technical constraints, and accounts for fixed costs. These features
are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs and in more detail in (Hirth 2012).
Generation is modeled as seven discrete technologies with continuous capacity: one
fluctuating renewable source with zero marginal cost and exogenous dispatch (wind), five
thermal technologies with economic dispatch (nuclear, lignite, hard coal, combined cycle
and open cycle gas turbines), and electricity storage (pumped hydro). Dispatchable plants
produce when the price is above their variable cost. An energy-only market is modeled.
The electricity price is the shadow price of demand, which is the marginal cost of
increasing demand in a certain hour. This guarantees that the prices in the long-run
equilibrium are consistent with the zero-profit condition for generators. Investments in all
generation technologies is possible, but in the short-term nuclear investments are
disregarded due to their long implementation time. Fixed O&M costs are taken into
account, such that existing plants might be decommissioned for economic reasons in the
STE.
In power systems, a large number of technical constraints affect the dispatch of plants. A
few of the most important ones are implemented as side conditions in the model. A share
of the thermal capacity is modeled as combined heat and power plants that sell heat as
well as electricity. These plants are forced to run, even if prices are below their variable
costs. Ancillary services such as regulating power are modeled as a spinning reserve
requirement that forces dispatchable capacity equivalent to 20% of the yearly peak
demand to be online at any point of time. While internal grid constraints are ignored,
cross-border flows are limited by net transfer capacities.
Demand as well as wind generation time series are based on empirical 2010 data. Using
historical time series ensures that crucial correlations across space, over time, and
between parameters are captured. The model is calibrated to North-Western Europe and
covers Germany, Belgium, Poland, The Netherlands, and France. The model is linear,
written in GAMS and solved by Cplex. It has been back-tested with historical data and is
9
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

9

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 733 [2012]

able to replicate dispatch decisions as well as prices in a satisfactory manner. Cost and
technical parameters are consistent with empirical data, and were chosen such that
today’s capacity mix is roughly replicated in the long-term equilibrium (Figure 3).
Long-term equilibriums of power markets have been estimated numerically by Lamont
(2008), Bushnell (2010), and Green & Vasilakos (2011), but these authors do not discuss
the short term nor distribution issues.

100%

75%

OCGT
CCGT
Hardcoal
Lignite
Nuclear

50%

25%

0%
Modeled LTE
capacity

Actual 2009
capacity

Figure 3: Model long-term equilibrium dispatchable capacity mix versus historical capacity mix in 2009 for the
model region. The modeled LTE capacity mix, which is used as a starting point for policy analysis, resembles
quite closely to the observed data. Wind power is too expensive to be built.

4. Wind Support
This section presents analytical and numerical model results of the redistribution effects
of wind support schemes. As explained in section 3.1, it is assumed that the electricity
market is in its long-term equilibrium prior to the introduction of wind support, and
effects take place in the short term. Distributional effects emerge because costs for the
existing capital stock are regarded as sunk. Support policies are not modeled explicitly,
but implicitly by exogenously increasing the amount of wind power. The costs of wind
support are then calculated ex post as the gap between full costs and market income,
assuming a perfect policy design that does not leave any rents to wind generators.

4.1. Analytical Results
Renewable support policies have the effect of pushing additional low-variable cost
capacity into the market relative to the long-term equilibrium. As a consequence, wind
power replaces high-variable cost gas power plants when it is windy. Hence, during some
hours coal is setting the price instead of gas power plants that become extra-marginal. In
those hours the electricity price is reduced. In all other hours the electricity price remains
unchanged. This implies that wind support never increases short-term rents of any
10
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existing generators. With inelastic demand the reduction of producer rents equals gains in
consumer surplus. In addition, consumers are assumed to bear the economic costs of
wind subsidies. The net effect of wind support on consumer surplus is thus a priori
ambiguous and depends on the relative size of redistribution of producer surplus to the
costs of subsidizing wind power.
Figure 4 compares the short-term equilibrium of the electricity market prior (left) and
after (right) the introduction of wind power. The left hand side is identical to the right
hand side of Figure 2. Additional wind capacity has no effect on the cost structure of
dispatchable generators, thus the short-term screening curves do not change (a, d) and
dispatchable capacity remains the same (capacity bars in c and d are identical). However,
residual load is reduced during windy hours, shifting the RLDC downwards (b, e). The
RLDC also becomes steeper because load during the peak hour of the year remains
virtually unchanged6. The amount of energy generated in dispatchable plants, the integral
under the RLDC, is reduced. Thus full load hours of all dispatchable plants are reduced:
existing capacity is utilized less – this is why Nicolosi (2012) calls the impact of wind on
the RLDC the “utilization effect”. Most importantly, the PDC is shifted (c, f) to lower
prices, because the number of hours where gas is price-setting is diminished.
The effect of wind support on incumbent generators is determined by the shift of the
PDC. The short-term rents of gas plants remain zero even though less energy is
generated. This is because gas power plants are price-setting whenever they operate. In
contrast, coal power plants earn profits when gas is price-setting. Hence, coal power
plants lose because the number of hours when gas is price-setting is reduced. The
reduction of coal rents equals the change of total producer rents. The checkered area in
Figure 4f shows the loss of the specific (per MW) rent of coal capacity:
. The absolute decrease of
is given by the coal capacity
times
the specific loss.
(7)

Only the last factor depends on the deployment of renewable capacity: The shift of the
PDC to lower prices mainly drives redistribution due to renewable support.

6

This is the case when the renewable technology has a comparable small capacity credit like wind power in Europe.
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Figure 4: Short-term screening curves, load duration curves, price duration curves without (left) and with wind
support (right). Wind changes the residual load duration curve (b, e). Producer rents decrease with wind
support (checkered area equals the reduction of specific coal rents).

A strong analytical result is that the rents of incumbent generators never increase due to
wind support policies. Rents of the base load technology (coal) decrease, while rents of
the peak load technology (gas) remain unchanged. The total effect is proportional to the
reduction of hours in which gas is price-setting. Consumer rents increase by that amount
minus the costs of wind support. The net effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous.

4.2. Numerical Results
In the following, the numerical model introduced in section 3.3 is used to derive
additional details and quantifications in three directions. Firstly, redistribution flows are
quantified and are shown to be significant in size. Secondly, a wider set of dispatchable
generation technologies is modeled, such that loosing and winning generators can be
identified more specifically. Finally, the costs of optimal wind subsidies are estimated,
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and it is shown that for moderate amounts of wind power the net effect on consumer
surplus is positive.
In the long-term equilibrium wind is absent, thus all incumbent generators are
conventional. Table 1 presents the changes in producer and consumer surplus caused by
an exogenous increase of the wind share from zero to 30% of electricity consumption.
Results are given per MWh of total annual consumption to facilitate comparison.7 Shortterm rents of conventional generators are in average reduced by 22 €/MWh. Nuclear rents
almost vanish, coal rents are reduced by 80%, and gas rents by 70%. As indicated by the
analytical, model base load generators lose most, since their income is reduced during a
relatively high share of hours.
The effect on electricity consumers is displayed in Table 1b. Consumers save 28 €/MWh
in electricity expenditures, because 22 €/MWh are transferred from producers, and 6
€/MWh are saved due to lower fuel costs. On the other hand, consumers pay slightly
more for heat, ancillary services, and grid fees. In addition, they have to bear the costs of
incentivizing wind investments, which is 18 €/MWh. In sum, they receive a net benefit of
7 €/MWh. In other words, at 30% penetration rate the merit-order effect is larger than the
cost increase due to wind subsidies. Despite wind power being inefficient, pushing it into
the market reduces net consumer costs by transferring surplus from producers. This is
consistent with the findings of previous studies (de Miera et al. 2008, (Sensfuß et al.
2008), O’Mahoney & Denny 2011 and Gil et al. 2012).
Welfare is reduced by 15 €/MWh (Table 1c). This is the net economic cost of wind
power. Note that external effects such as the costs of carbon or knowledge spillovers are
not accounted for in this model. The welfare effect is merely the distortive effect of
policy on the electricity market.

Incumbent Producers

Consumers

Welfare

(€/MWh)

(€/MWh)

(€/MWh)

Nuclear Rents
Coal Rents
Gas Rents

- 13
-9
-1

Producer Surplus - 22

Electricity market
Heat market
AS market
Interconnectors
CO2 taxes
Wind subsidies

+ 28
-2
- 0.1
- 0.2
/
- 18

Consumers
Producers

- 22
+7

Welfare

-15

Consumer Surplus + 7
Table 1a-c: Changes in short-term surplus of producers and consumers, and welfare changes when increasing
wind penetration from zero to 30% (€/MWh). Previously existing generators lose, while gross benefits for
consumers via the electricity price are larger than costs of subsidies, thus overall consumer surplus increases.

The redistribution flows are economically highly significant: The surplus redistributed
from producers to consumers due to wind subsidies is larger than the efficiency effect of
7

Thus results can be interpreted as normalized to a total electricity consumption of one MWh.
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this policy. Short-term profits are 25 €/MWh prior to the policy shock, thus they are
reduced by almost 90%. Total long-term costs of electricity are 78 €/MWh, thus the loss
in producer surplus is about 28% of total revenues of the industry.
Figure 5 displays the costs of electricity supply and short-term producer rents at wind
penetration rates between zero and 30%. While total costs of electricity supply increase
when more wind capacity is added to the system, incumbents’ profits continuously fall.
The latter effect is larger than the former, such that consumer expenditures are reduced.
At a penetration rate of 10% consumer benefit the most. However, decreasing short-term
producer rents are not sufficient to cover fixed costs (“missing money”), as indicated by
the dotted box. Conventional generators do not earn their expected rate of return, and
might go bankrupt. Nonetheless, the “missing money” result does not imply that capacity
payments are needed to restore allocative efficiency or secure supply. In our framework,
energy-only markets with scarcity pricing provide sufficient incentives for new
investments.

Short-term producer rents
Total costs of electricity supply
Incumbents' capital costs

€/MWh

60
40

25

4

3

11

7

28

30

35

40

26

0

5

10

20

30

20
0

Wind market share (%)
Figure 5: Rents and costs at different wind penetration rates. The sum of the colored bars is consumer
expenditure. With increasing wind penetration, producer rents are transferred to consumers. At 10% wind
market share, short-term consumer surplus is maximal.

Figure 6 shows how the price-setting technology shifts when adding more wind capacity
to the system. This is the mechanism how producer rents are transferred to consumers via
lower prices. As derived in section 4.1, the additional capacity causes generators with
lower variable costs to set the price more often. Without wind, gas plants set the price in
50% of all hours, and hard coal during most of the remaining time. At 30% wind
penetration, the price drops to zero in 10% of all hours, and in an additional 50% of the
hours the base load technologies lignite and nuclear set the price.
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100%
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OCGT
CCGT
Hardcoal
Lignite
Nuclear
Must-run (zero)
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0%
1

5

10
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30

Wind (%)

Figure 6: Share of hours in which different technologies are price setting. With higher wind penetration, the
share of base load technologies increases. At 20% wind and above, prices drop to zero, when must-run
constraints become binding.

4.3. Findings
Several findings emerge from our analytical and numerical analysis of redistribution
effects of wind support policies. Triggering significant amounts of wind investments will
always reduce the electricity price. This implies a redistribution of surplus from
incumbent generators to consumers. Thus wind support policies can be seen as a
mechanism to transfer rents from producers to consumers. This is possible only if
investments are sunk. Transfers are large relative to welfare effects and relative to other
benchmarks. Base load generators lose relatively more than peak load generators. At
moderate penetration rates (up to at least 30%) consumers benefit even if they pay the
wind subsidies. Consumer surplus is maximized at around 10% wind share. Other types
of renewables such as offshore wind power and solar power are more costly than onshore
wind. Subsidizing those technologies could have a negative net effect on consumers,
since potentially the costs of subsidies are larger than redistributed producer rents.

5. CO2 Pricing
This section presents analytical and numerical model results of the redistribution effects
of carbon pricing. The price of CO2 could be implemented via a price or a quantity
instrument, both classes of policies are equivalent in the present models. It is assumed
that neither emission rights are allocated freely to emitters nor there is any other direct
transfer to generators.
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5.1. Analytical Results
Carbon pricing increases the variable costs of CO2-emitting plants. This increases the
electricity price whenever these technologies are marginal generators. In all other hours,
the electricity price remains unchanged. This implies that carbon pricing never decreases
the short-term rents of carbon-free generators, while the effect on emitting generators
depends on their relative carbon intensity and their location in the merit order. With
inelastic demand the increase of producer rents equals losses in consumer surplus, and
vice versa. In addition, consumers are assumed to receive the revenue from carbon
pricing as a lump-sum transfer. The net effect of pricing carbon on consumer surplus is
thus a priori ambiguous and depends mainly on the generation mix prior to the policy
shock and the size of the shock.
Figure 7 shows short-term screening curves for different CO2 prices. Figure 7a displays a
price of zero and is identical to Figure 2b. With higher carbon prices, the variable costs of
emitting technologies increase and thus the short-term screening curves pivot around
their vertical intercepts. This effect induces changes of short-term profits. Six
qualitatively different CO2 price regimes can be identified (a-f).
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Figure 7: Short-term screening curves for coal and gas power plants. The CO2 price increases from Figure a to f,
and thus the short-term screening curves pivot further around their vertical intercepts. Six qualitatively
different CO2 price levels can be identified.

(a) Without CO2 pricing costs and rents are
as derived in section 3.
(b) An increasing CO2 price causes the screening curve of coal to pivot faster than the
screening curve of gas. Coal rents decrease in proportion to the decreasing variable
cost gap
, while capacities as well as dispatch remain unchanged.
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(c) At a sufficiently high CO2 price, the two screening curves coincide.8 Capacities
remain unchanged, and dispatch is arbitrary since both technologies feature identical
variable costs. Total producer rents are zero because the price always equals the
variable costs.
(d) Further increasing the CO2 price increases the variable costs of coal above those of
gas. The coal screening curve is steeper and above the gas curve. While capacities
remain unchanged, now the dispatch changes (“dispatch fuel switch”): gas plants now
cover base load. While coal plants do not earn any profits, gas plants generate rents
when coal power plants are price-setting.
(e) At an even higher CO2 price, the screening curve of coal touches the screening curve
of new gas power plants even though the latter also contains investment costs.9 At
this point, new base load gas is as expensive as old base load coal (“investment fuel
switch”). The rents of gas power plants reach a maximum.
(f) At higher CO2 prices, the end of the short-term coal screening curve lies above the
long-term gas screening curve. Now, it is efficient to replace coal plants that operate
with full load hours higher than
by new gas plants.10 Only old gas plants generate
rents. These rents remain at the level they reached in (e). This regime is further
discussed in the remainder of this subsection and shown in Figure 9.

Figure 8: Rents of gas and coal power plants change with increasing CO2 price. Six regimes (a-f) can be
distinguished. Coal rents decrease to zero, while gas rents increase to a maximum level. The gas rents in regime
(e) and (f) could be above or below the coal rents in (a), depending on the initial capacity mix (see result derived
below).

Figure 8 summarizes the development of short-term rents of coal and gas power plants
when the carbon price increases. It illustrates that rents shift from coal power plants to
gas power plants. The change of total producer rents (coal and gas) depends on the initial
capacity mix of coal and gas as we show later this section.
In detail we discuss regime (f) because it includes a multitude of relevant policy-induced
effects. Figure 9 compares the short-term equilibrium of the electricity market prior (left)
8
The short-term screening curves coincide at a carbon price of 65 €/t CO2, assuming variable costs of 25 €/MWhth (gas) and 12
€/MWhth (coal), efficiencies of 48% (gas) and 39% (coal), carbon intensities of 0,24 t/MWhth (gas) and 0,32 t/MWhth (coal).
9
This happens at about 80 €/t CO2, with the same efficiency assumptions and investment costs of 100€/kWa (gas).
10
It is assumed that new gas power plants have the same costs and the same efficiencies as old ones.
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and after (right) the introduction of a carbon price. The short-term screening curves in
Figure 9 (a, d) change according to the development illustrated in Figure 7f. Variable
costs of coal are above those of gas, thus the coal screening curve is above the gas curve
for existing plants. The dispatch is transposed: coal is shifted to peak load, existing gas
power plants cover base load (Figure 9e). Coal rents vanish, while incumbent gas plants
generate profits when coal is price-setting (Figure 9f).

Figure 9: Short-term screening curves, load duration curves, price duration curves without (left) and with CO2
pricing (right). Coal rents disappear, while gas rents appear. New gas power plants are built.

Moreover investments in new gas power plants are profitable because screening curves of
new gas power plants and existing coal power plants intersect (Figure 9d). All coal power
plants that would otherwise operate at full load hours higher than
are replaced. The
remaining coal power plants operate at lower full load hours. New gas plants are assumed
to have the same efficiency parameters as old plants, thus the dispatch of old and new gas
does not need to be distinguished.
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Hence all gas plants have the same specific income indicated by the shaded area (Figure
9f):
. The absolute rents of old gas are derived by multiplying with the
old gas capacity:
(8)

is given by the intersection of new gas power plants and existing coal power plants
intersect:
(9)

Thus
is the “break-even point” in term of FLH. For utilization higher than
it is
profitable to build new gas capacity. Because the zero-profit condition needs to hold for
new investments, this can be substituted into equation 8 and it follows:
(10)

One MW of existing gas capacity receives short term rents that are exactly equal to the
costs of constructing new capacity. Thus the sunk nature of capital can be understood as
entrance barrier that allows investors to generate profits. Total gas rents
depend
only on the fixed costs of gas investments and on their initial capacity. With higher CO2
prices the cost gap
increases in proportion to the decrease of , since (9)
has always to hold. Analogously the short-term income of new gas power plants are
and hence exactly cover their investment costs so that they earn zero
profits. That condition needs to holds for all new investments.
To calculate the total effect of carbon pricing on the total producer rents we need to
calculate the coal rent before the policy. When the CO2 price is zero coal power plants
earn their maximum rent
this can be calculated by inserting equation 4 into
equation 6:
(11)

Now we compare total producer rents (the sum of coal and gas plants), assuming
realistically that coal plants are twice as capital intensive as gas plants (
).
Thus from equations 10 and 11 it can be followed that the change in producer rents
depends only on the initial capacity mix:
(

)

(12)

If there is more low-carbon gas than carbon-intensive coal capacity in the initial mix the
total producer rents will increase with high CO2 prices. This is a surprisingly simple
condition and one of our main analytical model results.
To conclude, increasing the CO2 price leads to high redistribution flows between the two
producers. The initial rents of coal power plants vanish. Rents of gas power plants occur
after a certain threshold and increase up to a maximum level. The resulting change of the
total producer rents depends on the CO2 price and the initial mix of existing capacity.
In this analytical model, it requires very high CO2 prices and more initial gas capacity
than coal capacity to increase total producer rents. If we add a low-carbon base load
technology like nuclear power to the model, it can be shown that CO2 pricing increases
20
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producer rents under a much wider set of parameters. While these results are not shown
analytically due to space constraints, they are discussed in the following subsection.

5.2.Numerical Results
Table 2 presents the changes in producer and consumer surplus caused by an exogenous
increase of the carbon price from zero to 100 €/t. A CO2 price of 100 €/t has a similar
welfare impact as supporting wind power to reach a market share of 30% and is in that
sense a similarly “strong” policy intervention. The surprising result: despite full
auctioning, overall short-term producer rents increase. Nuclear power, while not being
affected on the cost side, gains from increased electricity prices and can more than double
short-term profits. On the other hand, coal plants lose most of their short-term profits.
Gas rents increase their initially low profits by 15%. If large-scale new nuclear
investments would be possible in the short run, nuclear profits would be limited by new
investments. The finding that overall producer rents increase is consistent with some
previous studies, for example Martinez & Neuhoff (2005) and Chen et al. (2008).
Consumers have to pay 43 €/MWh more for electricity, and have to bear higher costs for
district heating, ancillary services, and grids as well. On the other hand, they receive a
lump-sum transfer of 20 €/MWh of revenues from the carbon market. Overall, consumer
surplus is reduced by 29 €/MWh. Summing up consumer and producer surplus gives a
distortive welfare-reducing effect of 17 €/MWh on the electricity market. Again, this
calculation ignores efficiency gains from internalizing carbon externalities.

Incumbent Producers

Consumers

Welfare

(€/MWh)

(€/MWh)

(€/MWh)

Nuclear Rents
Coal Rents
Gas Rents

+ 21
- 10
+0

Producer Surplus + 12

Electricity market
Heat market
AS market
Interconnectors
CO2 taxes
Wind subsidies

- 43
-6
-0
-0
+20
/

Consumers
Producers

- 29
+ 12

Welfare

-17

Consumer Surplus - 29
Table 2a-c: Changes in short-term surplus of producers and consumers, and welfare changes when increasing
the CO2 price from zero to 100 €/t (€/MWh). Producers gain and consumers lose.

As in the case of wind support, the transfers between economic actors due to carbon
pricing are large in size. The surplus redistributed from consumers to producers is larger
than the efficiency effect of this policy. Short-term profits are 25 €/MWh prior to the
policy shock, thus they are increased by about 50%. In contrast to wind support and as
indicated by the analytical model, carbon pricing also leads to massive redistribution
between different generation technologies, from carbon intensive to low-carbon
generators. According to our estimates, nuclear power plants more than double their
profits.
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If emission allowances would be allocated freely to producers instead of being auctioned,
this would increase producer rents by another 20 €/MWh. Thus the rents generated by
increasing in spot prices are of the same order of magnitude as the rents generated from
entirely free allocation, while having received much less attention in the public and
academic debate.
Figure 10 displays the costs of electricity, suppliers’ expenditures for CO2, and short-term
producer rents at carbon prices between zero and 100 €/t. The sum of these three
components equals consumer expenditure for electricity. Short-term producer rents
increase continuously, driven by increased nuclear profits. Carbon-intensive coal power
plants continuously lose surplus. Recall that the effect of CO2 pricing on total producer
rents was found to be dependent on the initial capacity mix in section 5.1. Empirically,
the increasing rents of low-carbon producers overcompensate for decreasing rents of
carbon-intensive generators, because of the significant amount of installed nuclear power
in the long-term equilibrium derived in section 3.3. In contrast to the effect of wind
support consumer expenditures continuously increase even if revenues from the carbon
market are transferred to the consumers.

Short-term producer rents (w/ numbers)
Total costs of electricity suppy w/o CO2
CO2 expenditure
Incumbents' capital costs
37

€/MWh

75

31

50

29

29

25
25
0
0

17

33

66

100

CO2 price (€/t)
Figure 10: Rents and costs at different CO2 prices. The sum of the colored bars is consumer expenditure, but
CO2 expenditure of fossil plants (dark green) is recycled to consumers via lump-sum payments. Short-term rents
increase with higher carbon prices (“windfall profits”). Rents increase over and above the level that is needed to
recover capital costs.

In contrast to wind support, carbon pricing has very different effects across countries:
because of large existing nuclear capacity in France, producer rents double when
introducing a CO2 price of 100 €/t. At the same time they remain constant in Germany,
because of the large carbon-intensive incumbent lignite fleet. This dependency of the
capital mix on the overall producer rents empirically confirms a qualitative result of the
analytical model.
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Figure 11 compares the merit-order curve without a CO2 price with that at 100 €/t. The
change in the merit-order curve is the fundamental reason for income transfers from
consumers to producers via higher electricity prices. At high carbon prices, lignite plants
would have higher variable costs than hard coal and CCGTs, but due to economic reasons
they are decommissioned. The underlying reason for nuclear to increase short-term
profits is that carbon pricing drives up the gap between nuclear and fossil plants. As in
Figure 9f, the carbon price is high enough to incentivize new investments, in this case
lignite CCS, CCGTs, and wind power.
250

100

Nuclear
Lignite CCS
Lignite
Hardcoal
CCGT
OCGT
CHP

200
€/MWh

€/MWh

150

150
100

50

Nuclear
Lignite CCS
Lignite
Hardcoal
CCGT
OCGT
CHP

50
0

0
GW

GW

Figure 11a-b: The merit-order curve without carbon pricing (left) and at 100 €/t CO2. The y-axis shows bidding
price that takes into account start-up costs. Only dispatchable plants are shown and capacity is weighted with
average availability.

5.3.Findings
The findings from modeling short-term effects of carbon pricing analytically and
numerically can be summarized as follows. Even without free allocation of emission
permits, surplus of electricity producers can increase. If that is the case depends on the
initial capacity mix prior to the policy shock. Specifically, if the infra-marginal capacity
is mainly low-emitting, producers as a whole benefit. If the infra-marginal capacity is
mainly carbon intensive, producers lose and consumers benefit (via tax or auction
revenues). At realistic cost parameters and under the given European electricity mix,
numerical model results show increasing overall producer rents at carbon prices of up to
100 €/t. Furthermore, this policy induces large transfers from carbon-intensive to lowcarbon generators. The overall gain in producer surplus is large, in the same order of
magnitude as the transfer due to free allocation of emission permits. Furthermore, the
different initial capacity mixes in European countries lead to significant cross-border
transfers, the largest flowing from coal-intensive Germany to nuclear-intensive France.

6. Policy Mix
Comparing the two policy instruments with respect to their redistribution effect reveals
striking difference. While the welfare effect of each policy as well as the size of
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redistribution between consumers and producers is comparable in size, the directions of
flows are opposite. CO2 pricing transfers economic surplus from consumers to producers
while wind support does the opposite. Moreover, CO2 pricing leads to dramatic profit
transfers from carbon-intensive to low-carbon producers, while wind support policies
make all producers lose.
It is plausible to assume that policy makers try to avoid transferring surplus to
conventional generators.11 On the other hand, reducing generators’ short-term rents too
much might leave them in a situation where they can’t pay back their sunk investments
and go bankrupt, which might be undesirable from a policy maker’s perspective as well.
Given that CO2 pricing increases producer rents and wind subsidies reduce them, a mix
of both instruments allows mitigating CO2 emissions without changing conventional
generators’ rents too much. For example, introducing a CO2 price of 100 €/t and a wind
target of 30% simultaneously leaves conventional rents virtually unchanged (Figure 12,
Figure 13).

Short-term producer rents (w/ numbers)
Total costs of electricity suppy w/o CO2
CO2 expenditure
Incumbents' capital costs
25

€/MWh

75
24
19

50
25

16

0 €/t

17 €/t

33 €/t

66 €/t

100 €/t

0%

5%

10%

20%

30%

25
0

Figure 12: Rents and costs with a mix of policies. The policy mix represents a path which leaves rents roughly
unchanged.

11
Indeed, during the last years there have been fierce debates on „excessive returns“ and „windfall profits” in the context of
emission trading and renewables support schemes in several European countries.
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Wind penetration from zero to 30%
Carbon price from zero to 100 €/t
Both policies simultaneously

€/MWh

10
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-20
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Figure 13: Change in consumer rent, producer rent, and welfare due to wind support (30%), carbon pricing
(100 €/t) and a combination of the two policies. A policy mix reduced the impact on profits virtually to zero.

7. Conclusion
This paper discusses redistribution effects of carbon pricing and renewable support on
short-term producer and consumer rents in the electricity market. Results have been
derived from an analytical model and a numerical model that are applied in a framework
that allows isolating the redistributive effects of policies.
We find that redistribution flows are large relative to the welfare impact of these policies.
The two policies induce diametrically opposed redistribution flows: renewable support
transfers rents from consumers to producers, while CO2 pricing does the opposite. In the
case of renewables support, transfers are large enough to make consumers benefit from
moderate levels of wind subsidies even if they pay the costs of subsidies. Suppliers as a
group benefit from carbon pricing, even if they pay the costs of emission allowances, but
there are large transfers from carbon intensive to low-carbon generators.
In the economic literature on power markets and electricity policy, energy and climate
policies have the primary purpose of internalizing external effects. Distributional
consequences are seldom the focus of academic research and usually only briefly
discussed in the literature. In real world policy making, in contrast, redistribution effects
are often hotly debated. Given the size of transfers we find, this is not surprising.
Furthermore, our findings help explaining two stylized facts of energy policy: the attitude
of certain actors towards specific policies, and the existence of a mix of policies in many
countries. Our findings suggest that conventional generators should push for carbon
pricing, while consumers should prefer renewable support. These attitudes can indeed be
found in current European debates on energy policy.
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It is often found that carbon pricing is the first-best climate policy. The existence of
renewable support policies is often explained with other externalities like learning spillovers. We offer an alternative interpretation of this policy mix: undesirable distributional
consequences might prevent the implementation of carbon pricing alone and additionally
require renewable support. Specifically, we show that combining carbon pricing with
renewables support allows policy makers to keep producer rents unchanged.
In general, understanding redistribution effects helps policy makers designing a policy
mix that reduces implementation barriers.
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